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SILENCING DISCIPLINE IN LEGAL EDUCATION
Lucille A. Jewel*
INTRODUCTION

T

HIS essay is about academic freedom in the context of two groups that
are not often discussed together: critical outsider scholars1 and legal
writing teachers. Storytelling is the common thread that connects these two
groups. Both outsider scholars and legal skills teachers have special knowledge
that enables them to deploy storytelling in a way that moves the law forward in a
progressive direction, in the greater law culture and through teaching new
generations of lawyers. Both the voices of outsider scholars and legal skills
teachers have been targets of silencing discipline.
I use the term “silencing discipline” to invoke a set of practices that tends to
dis-incentivize the production of valuable legal meanings that can contribute to a
shape-shifting of legal culture. As this essay will show, silencing discipline has
evolved from the intra-academic critiques in the 1990s2 to a different form,
neoliberal rationality, which also tends to silence, but in a different way. In the
1990s, tenured or tenure-track outsider scholars were criticized based on their
purported intellectual deficits.3 There was the idea that outsider scholarship, on
topics of race, feminism, and LGTBQ issues, was not rigorous enough to pass
muster within the academy and was not appropriate for the award of tenure.4
Despite undergoing this crucible, outsider scholars were protected by longstanding
concepts of academic freedom (though fraught) and were taught on a tenure track.
Many outsider scholars from this era are tenured, distinguished professors: elders
in the field who mentor new generations of critical scholars.
In current times, the production of critical legal knowledge has become
constrained by a neoliberal education mindset that emphasizes economic

* I want to thank the organizers of this wonderful symposium, particularly Symposium Editor
Emina Causevic and Professors Nicole Porter and Shelley Cavalieri. I am also grateful to the other
wonderful participants at this symposium: Lisa Pruitt, Kingsley Browne, Nancy Cantalupo, Blanche
Cook, Rebecca Facey, Donald Kamm, Jessica Knouse, Saru Matambanadzo, Martha McCluskey,
Marc Spindelman, and Jennifer Wriggins. This was a wonderful day of intellectual sustenance and
nourishment, and I was honored to be a part of it.
1. I use the term critical outsider scholars to collectively refer to Critical Race Theorists,
Feminist Theorists, LGBTQ theorists, and Latino/a theorists.
2. See infra notes 85-159 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 131-145 and accompanying text.
4. See Cynthia Lee, (E)racing Travon Martin, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 91, 91 (2014) (citing
Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984)).
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performance and measured outcomes over critical thought.5 Neoliberalism, in the
context of education, strives to reduce labor costs as much as possible.6 This means
that tenure and tenure-track appointments are often put on the chopping block.7 In
the context of this article, the absence of tenure protection is a type of silencing
discipline. Unfortunately, as per recent amendments to ABA rules regulating legal
education, the erosion of tenure will likely become more prevalent in legal
education.8 The absence of tenure is the default for legal writing and legal skills
teachers, who also suffer from high levels of gender segmentation.9
This essay fits within several interlocking categories and draws upon
intellectual history, legal education reform, and critical theory. It not only explains
why the intense legal academic debates of the 1990s lost steam, but also how other
lines of reason emerged to function as silencing discipline. In this essay, I argue
that academic freedom, in the sense of being free to speak, write, and teach critical
knowledge, both in the intellectual sense and in the law practice sense, is being
eroded. And, I urge my critically minded colleagues that are traditional law
scholars (tenure-track or tenured) to consider the circumstances of law teachers
who currently do not have the protections of tenure but who generate valuable
knowledge, particularly in the realm of teaching critical common-law analysis and
lawyering skills. Together, we should oppose further encroachments of neoliberal
rationality into legal education. This is a matter of reform, but it is also a matter
of protecting our voice.

5. See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 181
(2015).
6. See David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law & Neoliberalism, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 21 (2014).
7. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
8. Instead of replacing retired tenured professors, law schools are incentivized to use more
visiting assistant professors and professors of the practice, non-tenure stream appointments, but with
responsibilities for teaching traditional “substantive” courses. Moreover, in 2014, as part of its
accreditation process, the ABA stopped inquiring into a law school’s full-time tenure-track
faculty/student ratio. In the earlier versions of the ABA regulations, the ABA considered this ratio.
See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2008-2009, at 32-33 (2008),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards/standards_archives.html
(under “Standards and Rules,” select the “2008-2009” hyperlink to download the pdf). To create a
favorable ratio, schools were incentivized to have full-time tenure-track or equivalent teachers. If a
law teacher did not have a tenure or tenure-like appointment, then that professor counted as .7 of a
teacher in calculating the ratio. See id. Although, there is still the requirement that the full-time
faculty teach “substantially all of the first one-third of each student’s coursework,” non-tenure-track
legal writing teachers are now defined as members of the full-time faculty. See SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2017-2018, at ix, 28 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
legal_education/resources/standards.html (select “Complete Bookmarked Publication) [hereinafter
2017-2018 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES] (“‘Full-time faculty member’ means an individual whose
primary professional employment is with the law school, who is designated by the law school as a
full-time faculty member, who devotes substantially all working time during the academic year to
responsibilities described in Standard 404(a).”).
9. See infra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.
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I. INSPIRED BY THE ENLIGHTENMENT: LEGAL FORMALISM
To begin, it would be helpful to describe the dominant culture within U.S.
legal education, which emphasizes concepts of logocentric thinking: objective
analysis, syllogistic frameworks, and rules.10 Another aspect of this dominant
culture is pedagogical, the idea that law teaching should advance legal formalism’s
precepts through the Socratic method and a rigid deductive logical structure
(IRAC).11 We start here because the two groups discussed in this paper, which
seem unrelated at first glance, both challenge the status quo in U.S. legal culture.
Critical outside scholars have challenged (and are challenging) the culture from an
epistemological angle, pointing out deep flaws in law’s enlightenment foundations
(sometimes referred to as classical liberalism).12 Legal writing and skills teachers
are analogous outsiders, studying and teaching rhetoric and persuasion in a critical
way that is contextualized through social, gender, and racial everyday life. Both
groups have been subjected to the silencing discipline within the legal academy.
Legal formalism13 is the name most associated with traditional legal culture.14
Much of U.S. law’s ethos arises from enlightenment ideals, the belief that humans
can successfully use reason and rationality to solve most problems.15 An
understanding of this culture, the substrate of U.S. legal education, illuminates how
legal meanings and legal minds are shaped. Legal formalism has shaped the
collective consciousness of countless lawyers as they become acculturated to
“think like lawyers.”16 Thinking like a lawyer is quite helpful for the process of
solving legal problems, but it can constrain and limit the legal imagination.17
Understanding how this collective mindset develops also sheds light on its limiting
effects.
Legal formalism developed in the nineteenth century.18 American law
professors shaped U.S. law by organizing the vast sea of common law concepts
into clean and orderly categories.19 Influenced by William Blackstone’s efforts to
impose order on U.K. common law, these professors divided U.S. law into
practical, useful, categories.20 Christopher Columbus Langdell is perhaps the best

10. See generally Lucille Jewel, Old School Rhetoric and New School Cognitive Science: The
Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 39, 55-56
(2016) [hereinafter Jewel, Enduring Power of Categories].
11. Id. at 59.
12. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987).
13. Legal Formalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 953-57 (1988).
15. See Jewel, Enduring Power of Categories, supra note 10, at 55.
16. See generally ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK
LIKE A LAWYER” (2007).
17. See James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School Ought
(and Ought Not) to Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 156, 159 (1986)
18. Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason & Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN
ST. L. REV. 397, 405 (2004) (quoting E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 31 (1999)).
19. Id.
20. See Jewel, Enduring Power of Categories, supra note 10, at 47-48.

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271967
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271967

660

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

known legal information architect of this era.21 As Dean of Harvard Law School,
Langdell authored the first contracts law casebook and is credited with organizing
contract law pursuant to modern doctrinal principles, such as formation (including
subcategories of offer and acceptance), breach, and damages.22
Langdell’s efforts to organize and make sense of American law were inspired
by natural scientists in practice at the time, who were cataloging and categorizing
plant and animal species.23 Amidst this organizing activity came Langdell’s idea
that “law is a science” and that to solve most legal problems, all one had to do was
consult a case book, find the rule, and apply it to the facts.24 Langdell deployed
this approach to law teaching, devising the casebook method, where he taught
students through Socratic questioning, using appellate case opinions as the base
materials for solving problems.25 Langdell’s pedagogy (intertwined with his
formalist approach to law) brought forth the IRAC26 method of legal analysis and
the Socratic method, which still pervades legal education today.27 The idea that
law could be reduced to principles of logic and science reflected the era’s
epistemological paradigm. Legal formalism was most certainly inspired by
enlightenment principles emphasizing objectivity, reason, and competition. Deep
respect for enlightenment principles continues in legal culture today.28
Legal formalism produced an undeniably helpful method for engaging with
the vast amount of legal information in the U.S. common law system. Without the
presence of legal categories housing researchable and synthesizable rules, the
practicing lawyer’s job would be impossible. While legal formalism’s teaching
methods—the Socratic method and IRAC—remain strongholds in legal education,
other teaching methods have emerged with pedagogical value.29 Moreover, as a
strain of jurisprudential thought, legal formalism is no longer the only legal
method; other modes of thought (such as legal realism, the legal process school,
the critical legal studies movement, and critical race and feminist theories) have
emerged.30 These other theories have augmented the process of producing legal

21. Bruce A. Kimball & Pedro Reyes, The “First Modern Civil Procedure Course” as Taught
by C.C. Langdell, 1870-78, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 294-95 (2005).
22. See Jewel, Enduring Power of Categories, supra note 10, at 49 (citing Catharine Pierce
Wells, Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 551, 566 (2010)).
23. Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of
Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 548, 597 n.276 (1997).
24. See Jewel, Enduring Power of Categories, supra note 10, at 47.
25. K.K. DuVivier, Goodbye Christopher Columbus Langdell?, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10475, 10476 (2013).
26. See generally Gerald Lebovits, Cracking the Code to Writing Legal Arguments: From IRAC
to CRARC to Combinations in Between, 82 N.Y. ST. B.J. 64 (2010).
27. Kimball & Reyes, supra note 21, at 295.
28. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT
ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 6 (1997) (“Law ... has often been seen as the province—whether in
reality or only aspiration—of reason rather than emotion, of principle rather than raw power.”).
29. Lucille Jewel, The Doctrine of Legal Writing: Briefs That Changed the World by Linda
Edwards, 1 SAVANNAH L. REV. 45, 66 n.135 (2014) [hereinafter Jewel, Doctrine of Legal Writing].
30. Id. at 57-59. Other jurisprudential styles have emerged since Langdell’s time, including
legal realism, the legal process school, and critical legal studies.
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meanings, but they have not fully replaced legal formalism as the go-to method for
legal analysis.31
Legal formalism is efficacious, but it has its faults. One point of critique is
that legal formalism limits the analysis to the precedential rule, and the relevant
facts limit the social and non-legal context that can be engaged with.32 Law-trained
anthropologist Elizabeth Mertz observed this phenomenon in her masterful study
of U.S. legal education, which she published in book form in 2007.33 Mertz’s
book, The Language of Law School: Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, collects her
anthropological observations of students at a major U.S law school.34 After
observing countless classroom dialogues between professors and students, Mertz
developed her theory:
Legal training focuses students’ attention away from a systematic or comprehensive
consideration of social context and specificity. Instead, students are urged to pay
attention to more abstract categories of legal (rather than social) contexts, reflecting
a quite particular, culturally driven model of justice.35

Mertz observed that in the law school classroom, the Socratic professor
accomplishes this acculturation process by controlling the conversation.36 This
occurs when the professor validates appropriate student responses by inserting
them back into the conversation and ignores inappropriate student responses.37
Inappropriate student responses are those that stray too far from the deductive
logical structure of the law—relevant facts, rules, precedent.38 Professors do this
by interrupting, cutting off, and responding to student comments in the dialog.39
In this way, the professor controls what legal meanings are produced.40 Thus, the
emotional and normative forces within a case are subjugated to concepts such as
procedure, precedent, and rule structure.41 Feminists have commented that the
law’s formalist aspirations (instantiated in traditional pedagogy) “to be rational,
objective, abstract and principled [is] like men.”42 “Given that women were long
excluded from the practice of law, it should not be surprising that the traits

31. Id. at 59.
32. See Regina Austin, “Bad for Business”: Contextual Analysis, Race Discrimination, and Fast
Food, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 207 (2000).
33. See generally MERTZ, supra note 16.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 54-56.
37. Id. at 54-55.
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 54-55.
41. Id. at 58-59.
42. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, 1 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1,
44 (2013) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice] (quoting Frances Olsen, The
Sex of Law (unpublished manuscript). The quoted portions of Olsen’s essay were later published
within a book. See Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 692-93 (David Kairys ed., 1998).
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associated with women are not greatly valued by law.”43 Thus, traditional legal
methods reify a voice of lawyering that is male derived.44 It has been posited that
woman lawyers speak in a different voice,45 a voice that is connected to others,
empathic, and caring.46 Minority legal scholars also speak in a different, but not
monolithic, voice; one that centers on the personal and palpable experiences of
centuries-long subordination and oppression.47 Traditional law, however, excludes
these voices on the ground that such perspectives are inappropriate for academia
and non-rigorous.48
Related to the above point—that traditional legal meanings marginalize
voices of women and minorities—is the contention that students from nontraditional backgrounds are often alienated by traditional legal pedagogy. The
Socratic method is indisputably competitive and inquisitorial,49 and it validates
those students “who think fast in a highly structured, performance-on-display
atmosphere.”50 Mertz and others have shown that, generally, African American
law students speak less than their white counterparts51 and that women speak less
than men.52 Women report being put off by the excessive gamesmanship of the
Socratic method.53
If legal education reproduces collective thought patterns related to the law,54
then we can see the deleterious effect of excluding voices in the process of making
legal meanings. When minority and female students are silent, their experiential
knowledge is not given weight in the socialization process.55 These actors become
culturally invisible and mainstream dominant thought patterns become more
dominant.56 More often than not, traditional law instruction obfuscates and elides
structural forms of social, racial, and gender discrimination that pervade everyday

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 42, at 44-45.
We should exercise caution at this point to avoid broad-stroke essentialism.
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 42, at 43-50 (citing CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982)).
47. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth and Narrative in the Social Construction of the
Black Self, 40 HOW. L.J. 1, 20-24 (1996); Matsuda, supra note 12, at 324.
48. See Robinson, supra note 47, at 34-36 (explaining how the work of minority law scholars is
often dismissed as inferior by the white, mostly male gatekeepers in legal academia).
49. The method has been referred to as requiring “excessive gamesmanship.” LANI GUINIER,
MICHLLE FINE, & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN 13 (1997). Harvard Law Dean Roscoe Pound
once described Langdell’s pedagogy as requiring “class-room logical acrobatics” that only men
(trained in Langdell’s method) could perform. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE, LAWYERS
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 84-85 (1976).
50. GUINIER ET AL., supra note 49, at 16.
51. MERTZ, supra note 16, at 184-203 (discussing her observations of African American
students).
52. GUINIER ET AL., supra note 49, at 12-16, 47 (discussing a study of women law students).
53. Id. at 13-15.
54. See generally Lucille Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools
Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155 (2008) [hereinafter
Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education].
55. MERTZ, supra note 16, at 202-03.
56. Id. at 203.
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U.S. life.57 These stories are the type of information that in formalistic pedagogy
are often excluded from the conversation.58 In this way, dominant legal meanings
that leave out alternative explanations based on lived social, racial, and gender
experiences are forged. Thus, legal formalism has been appropriately critiqued for
amplifying a male, white perspective59 and limiting the viewpoints and
perspectives of women and people of color.60 Traditional legal thought tends to
overlook creative modes for rethinking legal problems, because they do not fit into
the paradigm.61 Because the law is cloaked with so much power (i.e., the power
of the State), these one-sided legal meanings fail to achieve the normative ideal
that law should be an instrument of democracy.
Nonetheless, legal formalism, as applied in legal education, is not altogether
a bad thing. Traditional legal education has successfully professionalized scores
of lawyers, for over a century. Learning the language of the law, to “think like a
lawyer,” is necessary in order for lawyers to translate their client’s stories into the
formal language of the law. It would be a straw-man argument62 to blame legal
formalism for all that ails our legal system. In the United States, training in abstract
and deductive legal thought has been supplemented by other modes of law training,
including legal skills training.63 Excellent lawyers are taught (often in the legal
skills classroom) to use the Aristotelian concepts of logos and pathos64 to construct
their case theory. Skills teachers have become adept at teaching law students how
to use narrative to construct persuasive legal theories.65 In this context, pathos
forms the basis for needed context to make lawyering fully human.
In the critique of legal thought and legal education, however, context
infusions from legal skills teachers are often overlooked.66 Within critical legal
theory circles, legal skills teaching exists in a separate silo. Legal writing and legal
57. Id. at 207-08.
58. Id.
59. Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 886-87 (1989) (“If the law has been defined
largely by men, and if its definitions, which are presumed to be objective and neutral, shape societal
judgments as to whether a problem exists or whether a harm has occurred, then can the law
comprehend and adequately address women’s experiences of harm?”).
60. Austin, supra note 32, at 207 (“If race truly mattered, legal argument, writing, and
scholarship would pay much more attention to context than it does today.”). See also MERTZ, supra
note 16, at 6.
61. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Ask the Same Questions? The
Triple Helix Dilemma Revisited, 99 L. LIBR. J. 307, 308 (2007) (explaining that law’s existing
categories can constrain thinkers searching for innovative solutions to legal problems).
62. Wells, supra note 22, at 552.
63. Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research, Legal Writing, & Legal Analysis: Putting Law School
into Practice, 29 STETSON L. REV. 1193, 1193-95 (2000).
64. See Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 619 (2013).
65. See generally RUTH ANNE ROBBINS, STEVE JOHANSEN & KEN CHESTEK, YOUR CLIENT’S
STORY (2012).
66. For a well-stated explanation of how teacher/scholars can fuse progressive legal theory with
law practice to create a holistic style of lawyering, see Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory
and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996).
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skills professors are cordoned off (sometimes literally, with offices in the basement
of the law school), away from the tenure-track and tenured professors who teach
“substantive” law courses and write law review articles.67 Skills professors are
paid less on the basis that they do not engage in this kind of scholarly work.68
Moreover, critical outsider scholarship, despite being rebellious and risky (for
obtaining tenure), is nonetheless a creature borne out of elite law schools.69 Nonelite law schools have long emphasized practical training, which has historically
occupied a separate (and inferior) category from doctrinal teaching.70
What collective thought patterns have been forged in this years-long process
of law inculcation? Neurorhetoric, an emerging discipline that combines rhetoric
with neuroscience, explains how thought structures can become entrenched in the
brain.71 When individuals are exposed over and over again to certain thought
patterns, those thought patterns become wired together through the brain’s
synapses.72 Alternative modes of thinking become attenuated, dried out streams.73
These questions are important because legal education is not just about teaching
future lawyers. Law educators are also contributing to the collective neurological
mindset that we all adhere to.
When law students come out of law school and into the profession, we hope
that they have been initiated into a learned profession that values empathy and
service. Law students, however, have also been repeatedly exposed to reiterations
of law’s hyper-competitive culture that relentlessly ranks individuals on their
ability to perform analytical or adversarial tasks. For law students in this soup of
hyper hierarchy and competition, the aphorism that “you are not your grades” rings
particularly hollow, as almost all the signifiers define value based on intensive
merit performance. Status in the profession heavily depends on performance in an
abstracted environment—the LSAT, law school grades, the bar exam, etc. It is
reasonable to theorize that highly toxic neural pathways are forged in this culture.74
Just as the law is made up of so many either/or dichotomies, students are
encouraged to view themselves as either/or propositions—I am either a success or

67. Kristen K. Tiscione & Amy Vorenberg, Podia and Pens: Dismantling the Two-Track System
for Legal Research and Writing Faculty, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 47, 58 (2015).
68. Deborah J. Merritt, The Market for Legal Writing and Clinical Professors, L. SCH. CAFE
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2018/01/05/the-market-for-legal-writing-andclinical-professors/ [hereinafter Merritt, Market for Legal Writing and Clinical Professors].
69. See MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-5 (1993) (describing CRT’s origins at Harvard Law School);
Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education, supra note 54, at 1221-22 (explaining that non-elite
law schools offer fewer opportunities for students learn about critical legal theories).
70. See generally Lucille Jewel, Oil & Water: How Legal Education’s Doctrine & Skills Divide
Reproduces Toxic Hierarchies, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111 (2015) [hereinafter Jewel, Oil &
Water].
71. Lucille Jewel, Neuro-Rhetoric, The Law, and Race: Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing
Alternatives, 76 MD. L. REV. 663, 669 (2017) [hereinafter Jewel, Neuro-Rhetoric].
72. Id. at 669-71.
73. Id. at 670-71.
74. See generally ROLLO MAY, THE MEANING OF ANXIETY 173 (1977) (“[I]ndividual competitive
success is both the dominant goal in our culture and the most pervasive occasion for anxiety.”).
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a failure, depending on my grades and rank.75 Lawyer and law student stress and
anxiety are further exacerbated by the specter of heavy student debt loads and a
paucity of jobs.76 It is likely that the high levels of attorney stress, anxiety, and
mental health issues77 are products of law culture’s most unforgiving aspects.78
This essay addresses legal formalism for two reasons. First, through legal
education, legal formalism is the substrate upon which professional legal culture
is reproduced in the United States.79 In this way, understanding legal formalism
helps us understand some of the ingrained cultural tics of legal education. For
instance, legal formalism produced the professional identity of the traditional
tenure-track law professor as a well-paid teacher who instructs on legal doctrine
and writes law review articles.80 This professional identity is a traditional legal
meaning that has been challenged, particularly by arguments for the
professionalization of legal writing professors. Thus, an understanding of legal
formalism illuminates the last part of my essay, where I argue that low professional
status for legal writing professors is a silencing discipline.
Second, as discussed in more detail below, legal formalism’s enlightenment
norms (particularly the foregrounding of the concept of “reason”) played a large
role during the intellectual debates about critical race theory and feminist legal
theory in the 1990s. During this time period, traditional81 intellectuals and
academics charged that these kinds of legal thought were not appropriate patterns
for law, or for law professors. There was a deep discomfort with the idea that
perceptions of reality might differ depending on one’s vantage point in society.82

75. See Debra Austin, Killing Them Softly: Neuroscience Reveals How Brain Cells Die from
Law School Stress and How Neural Self-Hacking Can Optimize Cognitive Performance, 59 LOY. L.
REV. 791, 794-95 (2014) (“Law schools often define student success in terms of grades, class
standing, and journal participation.”).
76. See LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, HOW A DECADE OF DEBT CHANGED
THE LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCE 19 (2015), http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/LSSSE%20Annual%20
Report%202015[1].pdf.
77. NAT’L TASK FORCE ON LAWYER WELL-BEING, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE PATH TO LAWYER WELLBEING: PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSITIVE CHANGE 7 (2017), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/ThePathToLawyerWellBeingReportFINAL.pdf.
78. See Austin, supra note 75, at 793-94 (“Stress in legal education may also set the stage for
abnormally high rates of anxiety and depression among lawyers.”). See also JEAN STEFANCIC &
RICHARD DELGADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS 11
(2005) (arguing that legal formalism might be a causal factor in addressing why lawyers are markedly
unhappier than members of other professions, because it takes “the life out of work and the
professions, depriving them of juice, richness, concreteness, and anything else that might render them
of human interest”).
79. See generally Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education, supra note 54 (applying
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction to law schools, and arguing that as educational
institutions, law schools reproduce both the collective culture and mindset of the legal profession).
80. John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The
Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 315-16, 323 (1985).
81. I refer to the group of intellectuals who criticized critical race theory and feminist legal
theory as traditional because they represent the old guard of professors and intellectuals who
championed more of a narrow approach to legal thought and meaning making.
82. See infra notes 131-141 and accompanying text.
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In the 2000s, this discomfort with indeterminacy fell away as research on
cognitive biases, behavioral economics, biases in witness identification, and
persuasion psychology all pointed to the reality that the mind is not entirely
separable from the body.83 In other words, the enlightenment’s ideal of rational
“reason” does no match up with how people really think.84 Nonetheless, the 1990s
intellectual debate can be seen, in a sense, as a silencing mechanism, a way to limit
radical or progressive legal voices that depart from traditional legal meanings
(forged out of a formalist process). Thus, this essay now delves into the 1990s’
intellectual legal history, for the purpose of describing the landscape, but also
unmasking the silencing forces involved.
II. I LOVE THE 1990S
To get to the 1990s, we start in the 1970s, where a progressive intellectual
movement known as critical legal studies emerged. Relying on post-modern
theories, critical legal studies scholars argued that the underlying structure of law
was deeply hierarchical and slanted to favor those already in power.85 Out of the
critical legal studies movement came identity-based movements focused on race
and gender.86 In the 1990s, these movements gained prominence in the legal
academy and included (but was not limited to) scholars teaching and writing in
areas of critical race theory, feminist legal theory, and queer legal theory.87
Normally, it would be problematic to locate all of the progressive identity-based
legal theories in one category, as they each offer differing methods and
perspectives. But this essay focuses on the common thread that these theories
share—their radical progressivism, their rejection of enlightenment principles, and
their controversial nature. With the caveat that each theory should stand on its own
and be viewed with a high level of granularity, this essay will discuss these theories
together under the umbrella term “critical outsider scholars.” Further, in
discussing what motives drive outsider scholarship, this essay draws mostly upon
the lucid explanations offered by critical race theorists. It is also worth noting that
other scholars in this genre have written from the vantage point of gender, sexual
orientation, and other historically oppressed groups.
Critical outsider scholars approached law from an “avowedly political”
perspective and rejected legal formalism’s abstracted contexts as the foundation
for solving legal problems.88 Instead of the traditional method for case analysis,
critical outside scholars infused context into their work by presenting their legal
arguments in the form of stories and narratives. Critical outsider scholarship’s
array of rhetorical inventions include “personal histories, parables chronicles,
83. See infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
85. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and ______ Really Seriously: Before, During and
After “The Law”, 60 VAND. L. REV. 555, 567-72 (2007) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law
Seriously].
86. Id. at 575-76.
87. In their book, Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry single out “critical race theory, radical
feminism, and … ‘gaylegal theory’” as targets for critique. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 28, at 5.
88. MATSUDA ET AL., supra note at 69, at 3.
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dreams, stories, poetry, fiction, and revisionist histories”89 to highlight inequality
in race—Derrick Bell’s Space Invaders,90 Richard Delgado’s The Rodrigo
Chronicles,91 and Patricia J. Williams’s stories92 are the seminal representations of
the genre. Rather than engage in a narrow “case-crunching” style of legal analysis,
these thinkers raised provocative points through narrative. Several of these authors
used stories—stylized dialogue (Delgado), science fiction (Bell), or nonfiction
memoir (Williams)—to surface legal concepts that could not normally be seen in
the standard deductive logical structure of law.
In the parable of The Space Traders, Bell tells a story set in the future that
imagines what would happen if aliens came to earth and offered an astounding sum
of money (enough to bail out all bankrupt state and local governments), alien
technology nuclear fuel, and alien chemicals for cleaning up the U.S.’s toxic
environment.93 In return, all the U.S. had to do was to allow the aliens to take all
African American U.S. citizens back to the aliens’ home planet.94 In Bell’s story,
despite some opposition to the deal, the citizens vote to enact a constitutional
amendment to complete the deal with the aliens.95 Bell writes that this chronicle
was meant to illustrate the intractable obstacles that continue to prevent authentic
progress for blacks in U.S. society, namely, that whites do not wish to give up any
advantages to engender racial justice.96 To make his point, Bell imagines “how
this country would respond to a crisis in which the sacrifice of the most basic rights
of blacks[] would result in the accrual of substantial benefits to all whites.”97
With the Rodrigo Chronicles, Richard Delgado authored a number of
chronicles featuring dialogues between a fictional law graduate student, Rodrigo,
and his law professor mentor (based on Delgado).98 The conversations that unfold
in these narratives emphasize, in a jargon-free and grounded style, the structural
and implicit forces that prevent authentic racial justice from being fully realized in
the U.S. For instance, in the fourth Rodrigo’s chronicle, Rodrigo deftly explains
how neutral rules99 rarely detect discrimination because legal rules “are made
against a background of assumptions, interpretations, and implied exceptions,
things everyone in our culture understands but that seldom, if ever, get expressed

89. Id. at 5.
90. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 158-94 (1994) [hereinafter BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL]. The Space Traders chronicle is also reproduced in two law
review articles. See generally Derrick Bell, Racism: A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RUTGERS U.
L. REV. 92 (1989); Derrick Bell, After We’re Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a PostRacial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393 (1990) [hereinafter Bell, After We’re Gone].
91. See generally RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995) [hereinafter DELGADO,
THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES]; RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? (1996).
92. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
93. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 90, at 159-60.
94. Id. at 160.
95. Id. at 192.
96. Bell, After We’re Gone, supra note 90, at 396.
97. Id. at 397.
98. See generally DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 91.
99. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271967
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271967

668

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

explicitly.”100 Rodrigo also opines that where equally qualified black and white
candidates seek a job, the whites with hiring authority will tend to hire the white
candidate, on the basis of amorphous concepts such as “good fit” and better
“collegiality.”101 Here, Delgado’s Rodrigo is presciently describing implicit racial
bias, which will, in the 2000s, become accepted social science.102
The Alchemy of Race and Rights contains stories about Williams’s freighted
relationship with the law, the legal academy, and the palpable pain of experiencing
de facto racism.103 In one compelling chapter, Williams writes of her preference
for having a written lease in contrast with her white colleague Peter Gabel (a
founder of the Critical Legal Studies movement), who, as a skeptic of law’s ability
to achieve democratic social relations, was content with a handshake deal.104
Williams emphasizes her lived experience as a black female in her explanation:
As black, I have been given by this society a strong sense of myself as already too
familiar, personal, subordinate to white people. I am still evolving from being treated
as three-fifths of a human, a subpart of the white estate. I grew up in a neighborhood
where landlords would not sign leases with their poor black tenants, and demanded
that rent be paid in cash ....105

In another part of the book, Williams wrote about her experience at a
Benetton store in SoHo, New York.106 Williams grounded her experience by citing
various N.Y. Times accounts of retail stores using entry buzzers in a racially
discriminatory way.107 A young retail clerk, upon seeing Williams ring the buzzer
(a common security device in New York at the time), mouthed the words “we’re
closed,” even though it was 1:00 p.m. and even though other (white) shoppers were
inside the establishment.108 Williams was refused entry and there was nothing she
could do.109 As a matter of context, Williams noted that in the late 1980s and
1990s, Benneton was running its “United Colors of Benetton” campaign, which
intentionally used diversity and multi-cultural themes to market its designer
clothing.110 In a visceral way, Williams contemplated the “blizzard of rage” she
experienced, as the teenaged retail clerk was able to exert so much power over
her.111

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 91, at 63, 67.
Id. at 64-65.
See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 92.
Id. at 146-48.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. For an example of a vintage Benetton advertisement from this era, see Benetton, DEAR
GOLDEN (July 30, 2013), http://deargolden.blogspot.com/2013/07/benetton.html (collecting images
of the United Colors of Benetton campaign).
111. WILLIAMS, supra note 92, at 44-45.
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Williams’s chapter then morphs into a story within a story. She wrote about
her experience with the retail clerk and the buzzer and then enlarged the text and
reproduced it on a large poster, which she taped to Benetton’s storefront window,
after it “was truly closed.”112 Then, Williams published her experiences in essay
form for a law review symposium on excluded voices.113 In that context, Williams
recounted the marginalization that took place at the hands of the law review’s
editors (supervised by a faculty member) who removed references to Benetton
(because they could not verify the story in a footnote) and who edited out all
references to her race (because it did not “advance the discussion of any
principle”).114 Williams persuaded the editors to reinsert the reference to her
identity, explaining “that my story became one of extreme paranoia without the
information that I am black.”115 This particular chapter in Williams book vividly
illustrates the two-punch reality of: (1) living in a society replete with racist microaggressions that wound but which are not legally actionable; and, (2) being unable
to voice that experience in law’s “formalized, color-blind, liberal” language.116
Critical outsider scholars heavily influenced legal scholarship when they
emerged and formed critical mass in the mid- to late-1990s. At Tulane Law School
from 1997-2000, I gained exposure to these canonical texts through coursework
on Critical Race Theory and Feminist Legal Theory. As a law student struggling
with an intense feeling of alienation from, and anxiety about, the law (and its
formalist principles), I found these works to be liberating. These scholars
introduced highly controversial concepts of implicit bias,117 race and gender microaggressions,118 and intersectional119 discrimination. Today, these concepts seem
like foregone conclusions, but at the time, they were intensely controversial.
Believing that traditional “law is a cage within which radical social
transformation is impossible,” critical outsider scholars intentionally turned away
from formalistic and abstract legal reasoning.120 The path-breaking scholars had
the intuition that “[s]tories … can change the baseline.”121 Stories “can change
consciousness, change the narrative stock by which we interpret new stories.”122
By first saying what had previously been “unsayable,”123 critical outsider scholars
were early adopters who introduced novel concepts into the discourse.
112. Id. at 46.
113. Id. at 47.
114. Id. at 47-48.
115. Id. at 48.
116. Id. at 44-51.
117. Much of Rodrigo’s observations are observations of implicit bias.
118. Williams’s Benneton story is a story about a micro-aggression, a term that, at the time, had
not entered the public vernacular.
119. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
120. Matsuda, supra note 12, at 329.
121. DELGADO, RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 91, at 203.
122. Id.
123. See Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 208-09 (2014) (explaining how certain legal theories start out on the fringe,
but then get “onto the wall,” and become mainstream concepts).
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Neurorhetoric explains that through this process, new thought patterns for thinking
about the law were activated; actual neural pathways have eventually become
entrenched into new collective mindsets.124 This is progressive legal scholarship’s
greatest potential. Even if the verbalized ideas are not adopted by official legal
actors like judges and legislators, written scholarship sets in motion a process to
change collective consciousness and mindsets. This scholarship also carries value
in its counter-narrative function, to challenge and question traditional legal
meanings. Although traditional scholars would deny that legal meanings produced
through a reasoned application of formal legal process are stories, they are, in fact
stories with real effect that reify social reality.125 It is valuable to have competing
views.
In addition to the movement’s use of experiential narratives, another
controversial aspect of critical outsider scholarship was its acerbic critique (and
rejection) of liberalism’s enlightenment ideals of reason, objectivity, and
formalism. Critical outsider scholars rightly pointed out the canons of Western
liberal thought, from the enlightenment126 to the founding fathers,127 are based on
undeniably racist premises and assumptions. Western enlightenment philosophers
based their theory of reason and democratic civilization on a violent dichotomy
that set reason and (European) civilization in one corner and the state of nature
lived by savages (read, nonwhite) in the other.128 And all of the founding fathers
shared Thomas Jefferson’s belief that blacks were “inferior to the whites in the
endowments both of body and mind.”129
The 1990s brought forth the sounds of Public Enemy, De La Soul, Nirvana,
and Sonic Youth. The fashion trends centered on flannel shirts, Doc Marten boots,
and thrift store Levi’s jeans. The 1990s also presented the American public with
quite a few challenging incidents involving race, gender, the law, and the concept
of truth. The O.J. Simpson trial, the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas controversy, and
Bill Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky presented the public with disparate
narratives and differing perspectives. There was a sincere struggle to make sense
of mercurial facts in an increasingly media-saturated world. The American public
wrestled with what they were seeing on the screen. Ethics issues abounded as
talented and powerful lawyers (Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, Bill Clinton, Johnny
Cochran) sparred in very public forums to influence, persuade, and shape

124. Jewel, Neuro-Rhetoric, supra note 71, at 671.
125. See Steven Paskey, The Law Is Made of Stories: Erasing the False Dichotomy Between
Stories and Legal Rules, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 51, 51-52 (2014) (both rules and
formalist templates for legal reasoning contain stock stories and elements of a narrative story). See
also Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV.
665, 666 (1993) (“Empowered groups long ago established a host of stories, narratives, conventions,
and understandings that today, through repetition, seem natural and true.”).
126. See David P. Waggoner, An Inquiry into White Supremacy, Sovereignty, and the Law, 45
SW. L. REV. 897, 900-01 (2016).
127. See Bell, After We’re Gone, supra note 90, at 394-95.
128. Waggoner, supra note 126, at 899-900.
129. Bell, After We’re Gone, supra note 90, at 395 (quoting DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820, at 91 (1971)).
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perceptions of “the facts.” Scholars and intellectuals were rankled by the sentiment
that the facts—and the truth—might depend on individualized vantage points.130
Against this cultural backdrop, writers (scholars, judges, journalists) took aim
at critical outsider scholarship, targeting both its narrative subjectivity and
rejection of liberal enlightenment principles.131 In 1997, after a series of critiquing
articles, Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry of Minnesota Law School published
a book attacking critical outsider scholarship.132 The authors specifically focused
on the work of Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, Catherine MacKinnon, and Patricia
Williams.133 The authors’ main thrust of argument is that critical outsider scholars
should be faulted for abandoning “moderation, and common sense” in claiming
“that reality is socially constructed.”134 Farber and Sherry also charged that
narrative approaches to developing legal arguments lack rigor and have the
potential to “distort legal debate” and persuade too heavily by appealing to
channels of thought “outside the level of reason.”135 With respect to Patricia
Williams’s Benneton story, Farber and Sherry bluntly asked, “[W]hat is the point
of this story?”136 Rather than actively listen for Professor Williams’s artful multilayered meanings, the authors dismiss her work because “[t]he point of these
stories remains obscure in part because of the paucity of explicit reasoning
connecting them to a clear conclusion.”137 Arguing from the traditional law
professor’s perch of formalism, Farber and Sherry dispensed judgment on account
of a lack “of clear analytic framework,” which can “stall rather than expedite public
discourse.”138
Farber and Sherry’s book then became a springboard that others used to pile
on criticism of outsider scholarship. In reviewing the Farber/Sherry book, Judge
Richard Posner concurred with Farber and Sherry’s conclusions, expressing his
view:
Rather than marshal logical arguments and empirical data, critical race theorists tell
stories—fictional, science-fictional, quasi-fictional, autobiographical, anecdotal—
designed to expose the pervasive and debilitating racism in America today. By

130. See generally Ann Althouse, Invoking Rashomon, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 503 (remarking upon
the many 1990s media references to the 1950 Japanese film masterpiece, RASHOMON, which told a
story from four very different perspectives); Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC
(Dec. 9, 1996), https://newrepublic.com/article/74070/the-bloods-and-the-crits (problematizing
critical race theory because it enabled [in the author’s view] the type of lawyering that produced the
O.J. Simpson acquittal).
131. See generally Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques in Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1745 (1989); Arthur D. Austin, Storytelling Deconstructed by Double Session, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1155 (1992); Arthur Austin, Deconstructing Voice Scholarship, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1671 (1993); Mark
Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992).
132. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 28.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 39.
136. Id. at 85.
137. Id. at 86.
138. Id.
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repudiating reasoned argumentation, the storytellers reinforce stereotypes about the
intellectual capacities of nonwhites.139

Former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski chimed in to agree with Farber and
Sherry’s assessment, quipping that “[e]nlightenment concepts are now considered
a bit quaint and a bit dated—like stale granola.”140
Judge Kozinski also linked critical outsider scholarship to law student
learning, expressing disapproval that “[l]aw students are now being taught—at
least by some of their professors—that truth does not exist or, in any event, does
not matter.”141 Others have echoed Kozinski’s concern about what law students
were being taught. Other commentators expressed the same view, concern about
students being exposed to critical theories that took a nihilist view of the law and
law practice.142 The view was that critical and radical legal theories did not
adequately prepare students for law practice.143 As pointed out above, in the 1990s,
critical outsider scholars were under sharp attack for both their ideas and their
choices for expressing them.144 There was also the view that the type of
scholarship produced by the movement was sub-par and not sufficiently rigorous
to obtain tenure. Thus, young scholars were (and are) advised not to write radical
scholarship until they obtain tenure.145 Because of the power dynamics at play, the
criticism of critical outsider scholarship functioned as a form of silencing
discipline. The movement’s critics hailed from secure positions; the members of
the movement were, for the most part, new interlopers. The critics had tradition
139. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40, 42.
140. Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law, Review of Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on
Truth in American Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/11/02/
reviews/971102.02kosinst.html. Ironically, in the course of criticizing outsider scholarship for not
being sufficiently rational and logical, Kozinski inserts a humorous metaphor about stale granola, a
classic narrative technique.
141. See id. On this point, Farber and Sherry, as well as Judges Posner and Kozinski, take issue
with Patricia Williams’s chapter on the Tawana Brawley case. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra
note 28, at 95-96; Posner, supra note 139, at 42; Kozinski, supra note 140. All of these critics suggest
that Williams, in her telling of the story, asserted that that the truth does not matter. In the Tawana
Brawley case, a fifteen-year-old child was found naked and unresponsive, with urine-soaked cotton
stuffed in her nose and ears. WILLIAMS, supra note 92, at 169. In her statement to prosecutors,
Brawley named six white men as her attackers. Id. at 170. It later came out that the child’s
accusations were probably false. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 28, at 95. In her account of the
incident, Williams expresses a deep amount of cynicism about the process and the various selfserving actors (including a searing appraisal of Rev. Al Sharpton) who flanked around the child and
turned the incident into a race-based media spectacle. WILLIAMS, supra note 92, at 169-78. Although
Williams treated the child with empathy, I don’t view her chapter as an assertion that the truth does
not matter.
142. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34-36, 39-40, 47 (1992) (explaining the harm of exposing students
to impractical teaching that is too steeped in critical theory and not grounded enough in practical
doctrine); Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) (arguing
that scholars who espouse nihilism about the law should “depart the law school” as they “threaten[]
to rob his or her students … to act on [the] professional judgment as they may have acquired”).
143. Edwards, supra note 142, at 36-37.
144. DELGADO, RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 91, at 192.
145. Lee, supra note 4, at 91 (citing Delgado, supra note 4, at 561).
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(formalism, reason, and objectivity) on their side. The critical outsiders were doing
something entirely new, which was viewed as a serious threat to the traditional
way of doing things. The old guard attempted to maintain order and control over
the production of legal meanings, but critical legal outsiders prevailed in changing
cultural mindsets. This is not to say, however, that there was not some chilling
effect, as younger scholars tempered their voices to hew to dominant views, in an
effort to protect their careers.
We can learn a lot by evaluating the course of relatively recent intellectual
history. The two jurists most dismissive of critical outsider scholarship have
retired. Judge Posner abruptly retired from the bench to take up a laudable project
involving justice for pro se litigants.146 Judge Posner is admired for his high
principles and his endearing love of cats.147 Very recently, a former clerk alleged
that Judge Kozinski had engaged in sexual misconduct and emotional abuse with
his clerks (allegations that were then repeated by other former Kozinski clerks).148
After those allegations surfaced, Judge Kozinski abruptly retired from the Ninth
Circuit.149
The idea that social reality is constructed and that reason is infallible does not
seem radical now. First, with respect to the traditionalists’ emphasis on
enlightenment principles and “reason,” we have seen the rise of behavioral
economics, which accepts that human economic actors cannot be expected to act
rationally in a consistent manner.150 Rather, humans exhibit “bounded rationality,
bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.”151 Second, other work on
cognitive biases,152 the idea that humans do not often reach decisions rationally
146. Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, Judicial Provacateur, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posnerretirement.html.
147. LawProfBlawg & Eric Segall, Pixie for President: Why Judge Posner’s Cat Deserves Your
Vote, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 11, 2016), https://abovethelaw.com/2016/10/pixie-for-president-whyjudge-posners-cat-deserves-your-vote/.
148. Matt Zapotosky, Nine More Women Say Judge Subjected Them to Inappropriate Behavior,
Including Four Who Say He Touched or Kissed Them, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nine-more-women-say-judge-subjected-t
hem-to-inappropriate-behavior-including-four-who-say-he-touched-or-kissed-them/2017/12/15/872
9b736-e105-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html?utm_term=.0c8fcde98c30; Matt Zapotosky,
Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/prominent-appeals-court-judgealex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef
_story.html?utm_term=.f91f8bf3264f.
149. Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual Harassment
Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us/alex-kozinskiretires.html.
150. See Shahram Heshmat, What Is Behavioral Economics?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 3, 2017),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/science-choice/201705/what-is-behavioral-economics.
151. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-79 (1998) (emphasis omitted). See also RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2009). Richard Thaler won the Nobel Prize for economics in 2017.
152. See generally ROBERT KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013). Robert Kahneman
won the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002.
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and logically, also contributes to the continuing erosion in the Cartesian idea that
reason is reliable. Third, cognitive scientists have compellingly argued that reason
itself is not disembodied as Descartes supposed.153 Rather, reason is embodied, it
rises from the body and does not transcend it.154 Fourth, neuroscientists studying
political reasoning have found that subjects who engage in faulty and illogical
reasoning feel pleasure (the same type of pleasure that drugs induce) when that
reasoning leads them to conclusions that align with their personal political
preferences.155 In other words, we get a fix when we depart from “reason.”156
Fifth, research on implicit racial bias, emerging from an ongoing project at
Harvard, strongly supports the inference that de facto discrimination happens every
day on an interpersonal level.157 Sixth, every day we are confronted with claims
of alternative facts and fake news.158 And finally, the reality in the U.S. today—
documented police killings, stratospheric mass incarceration, violent rounding up
of immigrants, and a reality-show presidency—is worse than the most despairing
1990s critical legal theory fiction. The critical legal outsiders intuitively
documented and anticipated great many of these social phenomena.
Before moving to the next section, one other point is worth mentioning. The
writers who produced the trail blazing scholarship during the 1990s taught in
tenure-track positions or were tenured. Unlike the intellectual field in the 1990s,
the greatest threat for the production of progressive legal meanings does not derive
from professional peers who disagree with the message or even methods. Rather,
the ascendance of neoliberal rationality, and its application to legal education,
poses the greatest threat to the production of scholarship that can change the status
quo. Neoliberal principles of labor cost saving, deployed to limit tenure and
tenure-track positions, can shut down voices.
For years, neoliberal rationality has been applied to the segment of the law
professorate dedicated to teaching legal writing (and legal skills). This part of the
legal academy is also highly segmented by gender. Because it directs teaching
labor toward classroom teaching (but not producing scholarship), neoliberal
rationality functions as a silencing discipline. Because it is probable that the deprofessionalization trend will spread further within the legal academe, I urge my

153. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED
MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999).
154. See generally id.
155. Jewel, Neuro-Rhetoric, supra note 71, at 674 (citing DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN:
THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION 14 (2007)).
156. Id.
157. Information on Harvard’s Implicit Association Test (the IAT) can be found at Project
Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/. See also MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 77-86 (2005)
(explaining the IAT). For thorough explanations of implicit bias as it relates to law, see Jerry Kang
& Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465
(2010); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).
158. See Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative Facts’ on Crowd Size,
CNN (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternativefacts/index.html; Fake News in 2016: What It Is, What It Wasn’t, How to Help, BBC (Dec. 30, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-38168792.
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friends and colleagues who enjoy security of position159 (and the higher pay that
goes along with it) to listen to this warning story.
III. NEOLIBERALISM’S THREAT: DE-PROFESSIONALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
We start, again, in the 1990s. In August 1991, a story appeared on the second
page of The Lawyer Hiring and Training Report, a news publication devoted to
law firm and law school hiring trends.160 The news item described Tulane Law
School’s decision to tap the “Mommy-Track” for legal research and writing
instructors.161 In the story, Tulane’s Dean remarks that the “[m]ommy-track” is a
good solution to the problem of finding legal research and writing instructors.162
“The school will pay them a few thousand dollars per school year for the part-time
teaching.”163
Though the Tulane mommy-track news item was published almost thirty
years ago, its precepts are still accurate. The mommy-track appellation admits to
the gender segmentation in the field of legal writing. Mommy-track also conveys
the reality that legal writing positions do not receive the same security of position
as traditional law teaching jobs. Furthermore, Tulane’s salary strategy (a few
thousand dollars per school year) reflects the low status afforded to legal writing
instructors.
Then and now, legal writing professors occupy the lowest rung in the law
school caste system, with clinicians occupying only a slightly higher perch.164
Legal writing professors are 72% female; clinical faculty is 62% female.165 Only
18% of legal writing faculty are tenured or on a tenure track, although 6% of

159. I am one of the few professors who teach legal writing on a unified tenure track. At the
University of Tennessee College of Law, there are no distinctions between legal writing, clinical, or
doctrinal faculty. We are all treated exactly the same, in pay and security of position. I would add
that the University of Tennessee is one of the most affordable law schools in the country. See Mike
Stetz, Best Value Law Schools, NAT’L JURIST, Fall 2017, at 22-25, https://bluetoad.com/
publication/frame.php?i=443086&p=&pn=&ver=html5. A lengthy point about the cost of offering
security of position and equal pay structures to legal writing/legal skills faculty is beyond the scope
of this article. My own institution illustrates equity is possible, while still keeping tuition low.
160. Larry Smith, Tulane Taps ‘Mommy Track’ for Legal Writing and Research Instructors, 11
LAW. HIRING & TRAINING REP. 9, 13 (Aug. 1991). It is an ironic coincidence that this document
hailed from my alma mater.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Kent D. Syverud, The Caste System and Best Practices in Legal Education, 1 LEGAL
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 12, 13-15 (2002).
165. Robert Kuehn, Clinical Legal Education by the Numbers, 26 CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. ASS’N
NEWSL. 1, 6 (2017). Historically, clinical law teachers and legal writing teachers have occupied
slightly different tiers in the professorate “caste” system, with legal writing teachers at the bottom.
See Syverud, supra note 164, at 13-15.
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writing faculty are on a separate “programmatic” tenure track.166 ABA statistics
indicate that 56.6% of tenure-line professors are male and 43.4% are female.167
The median salary for all non-tenure-track legal writing professors as of 2015
is $73,000,168 $32,000 less than $105,000,169 a typical salary for an assistant (earlycareer) tenure-track professor. Similarly, Professor Deborah Merritt’s analysis of
publicly available salary data from an anonymized top-25 law school indicates a
$82,614 pay gap between clinical assistant professors and tenure-track assistant
professors.170 For professors at the senior level, the non-tenure track and tenuretrack pay gap widens to $97,322.171 The standard rationalization for the unequal
treatment of legal writing (and clinical) professors is that “[a]pplicants for legal
writing and clinical positions are plentiful ..., so the market drives their salaries
and status down.”172 The mommy-track concept reflects a neoliberal approach to
teaching labor—de-professionalize the labor, pay the least amount possible, and
chalk up the discriminatory gender issues to the market.
Neoliberalism is a loaded word, but its connotations are quite useful for
explaining current realities in legal education. In a nutshell, neoliberalism refers
to the political logic that foregrounds the market and individuals in competition as
the primary actors in society.173 It imports the market-model system of choice and
efficiency and applies that system across the board to all individuals.174 The
ascendance of neoliberalism has been described as a “stealth revolution” that has
successfully erased intelligent, legitimate, and democratically centered alternatives
to market ordering.175
In general, neoliberalism’s powerful market logic conflicts with democratic
demands for “reasonable level[s] of economic opportunity, distributive fairness,
workplace security, community and solidarity, and civic equality.”176
Neoliberalism’s enormous rhetorical power works through its value free
framework. Instead of top-down moral valences that determine social outcomes,
166. Kuehn, supra note 165, at 7. Programmatic tenure tracks offer a security of position, but
usually pay less in salary than the standard “doctrinal” tenure track.
167. Jewel, Oil & Water, supra note 70, at 120 n.48 (citing Statistics, Law School Faculty and
Staff by Ethnicity and Gender, AM. BAR ASS’N (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html).
168. See ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & THE LEGAL WRITING INST., 2015 REPORT OF THE
LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 77 & 78 (2015), http://www.alwd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2015survey.pdf.
169. See Kuehn, supra note 165, at 7 (citing SOC’Y OF AM. LAW TEACHERS, 2015 SALARY SURVEY
2 & 3, https://www.saltlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/SALT-salary-survey-2015-REVISEDfinal.pdf).
170. Deborah J. Merritt, Salaries and Scholarship, L. SCH. CAFE (Jan. 13, 2018),
https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2018/01/13/salaries-and-scholarship/.
171. Id.
172. Merritt, Market for Legal Writing and Clinical Professors, supra note 68.
173. See BROWN, supra note 5, at 10, 17, 28, 30, 42.
174. Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
71, 73 (2014).
175. BROWN, supra note 5, at 68-69, 115-16.
176. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law & Neoliberalism, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2014).
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market forces and consumer choices operate on a diffuse level, free from
interrogation, to order society.177 Thus, the standard answer to the question of why
legal writing professors are paid less and employed in more contingent work
arrangements (it is the market) is a neoliberal answer to the problem that
conveniently shifts the inquiry away from other explanations such as endemic
gender hierarchy).
Neoliberalism primarily treats human beings as capital investments,
productive machinery—”human capital.”178 With respect to work, neoliberalism
eschews any commitment, grounded in a sense of the collective good and moral
responsibility, to provide individual workers with a secure, life-long job that
carries a living wage.179 In this manner, neoliberalism has ushered in an era of
disaggregated production, offshore jobs, and temporary staffing models.180 Cost
savings, particularly labor costs savings, are a particular focus. Temporary and
lean staffing models, offering employer’s the greatest amount of flexibility, are
heralded as the solutions to the problem of “marginal utility,” the idea of limiting
jobs at the exact point where productivity is highest.181
Within higher education, neoliberalism’s market logic has given universities
the green light to eradicate tenure-line positions and replace them with adjunct,
contingent teaching labor. Thirty-five years ago, 75% of all college teachers were
tenurable; now, only 25% of college teachers are tenurable.182 In past years, there
have been numerous news stories about the plight of adjunct instructors struggling
to make ends meet in dead-end contingent jobs that fail to pay a living wage.183 In
undergraduate education, the tenure/adjunct line is also gendered. “The sectors in
which women outnumber men in the academy are uniformly the worst paid,
frequently involving lessened autonomy—as in writing instruction ….”184
In terms of the content of higher education, the neoliberal approach values
knowledge that can be directly translated into job readiness. Education as job
training has replaced the post-WWII idea that a liberal arts education in humanities
is helpful for educating individuals for participation in democracy.185 The only
exception is at the elite schools, which are able to deliver a liberal arts degree that
can be converted to valuable social capital.186 The same practical trend is true for

177. Blalock, supra note 174, at 99.
178. MALCOLM HARRIS, KIDS THESE DAYS: HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE MAKING OF MILLENNIALS
5 (2017).
179. Lifelong social support in exchange for a life’s work is referred to as the Fordist-Keynesian
social compact. See Loic Wacquant, Crafting the Neoliberal State, 25 SOC. F. 197, 201 (2010).
180. Id.
181. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 176, at 21.
182. MARC BOUSQUET, HOW THE UNIVERSITY WORKS: HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LOW WAGE
NATION 2 (2008).
183. See, e.g., Caroline Frederickson, There Is No Excuse for How Universities Treat Adjuncts,
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/highereducation-college-adjunct-professor-salary/404461/.
184. BOUSQUET, supra note 182, at 44. See generally EILEEN E. SCHELL, GYPSY ACADEMICS AND
MOTHER-TEACHERS: GENDER, CONTINGENT LABOR, AND WRITING INSTRUCTION (1997).
185. BROWN, supra note 5, at 181.
186. Id.
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law schools, with many of the non-elite schools focusing on practice skills while
the most elite law schools remain committed to legal education as a holistic and
interdisciplinary experience.187
With respect to managing higher education, universities have come to
resemble corporations. “[W]hile corporations developed research and
administrative ‘campuses,’ universities have become increasingly corporate in
physical appearance, financial structure, evaluation metrics, management style,
personnel, advertising, and promotion.”188 Tenure-line teaching positions have
waned, but at the same time, new administrative positions have been created,
creating a thick middle-management class within the university and weakening the
principle of faculty governance.189
Universities have also come to adopt corporate governance mechanisms that
overemphasize metrics and values. Wendy Brown writes that “all spheres of
existence are framed and measured by economic terms and metrics, even when
those spheres are not directly monetized.”190 In legal education, this rankings
obsession dovetails nicely with the pre-existing forms of competitive ranking and
hierarchy already part and parcel of law school culture (law school rank, class rank,
LSAT score, author citation rank, etc.). This intertwined synergy between classic
law school culture and neoliberal culture is perhaps a topic best saved for a
different piece. It is worth noting, however, that legal education’s current
obsession with outputs (jobs, practice ready, learning outcomes) is a distinctly
neoliberal phenomenon.
The ABA Standards that govern law schools (compliance is required for
accreditation) allow school administrators to continue to employ market-driven
labor cost savings practices to keep legal writing (and legal skills) pay depressed
and security of position hampered.191 Section 405(c) of the Standards provides
that clinical faculty should have “a form of security of position reasonably similar
to tenure” and section 405(d) provides that legal writing teachers should be granted
“such security of position and other rights and privileges of faculty membership as
may be necessary to (1) attract and retain a faculty that is well qualified to provide
[required] legal writing instruction ... and (2) safeguard academic freedom.”192
Additionally, section 405(d) allows schools to offer writing professors short term

187. See Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education, supra note 54, at 1221-22.
188. BROWN, supra note 5, at 199.
189. The growth of university administrators (deans, vice deans, assistant provost, etc.) is known
as “administrative bloat.” See JAY P. GREENE ET AL., GOLDWATER INST., ADMINISTRATIVE BLOAT AT
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES: THE REAL REASON FOR HIGH COSTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1 (2010),
https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/administrative-bloat-at-american-universities-the/
(select
hyperlink at the bottom of article to download the pdf). Administrative bloat represents the
application of neoliberal (or corporate) management principles onto the structure of higher education.
Administrative bloat “deprioritize[s] education and prioritize[s] business administration.” HARRIS,
supra note 178, at 57. See also BROWN, supra note 5, at 127 (explaining that neoliberal governance
privileges decision-making by management or administration over democratic processes (e.g.,
faculty governance) where debate and contestation produces the end results).
190. BROWN, supra note 5, at 10.
191. 2017-2018 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES, supra note 8, at 29.
192. Id.
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(as little as nine months) contracts, with no presumption of renewal.193 For
traditional law professors, ABA Standard 405(b) mandates that “[a] law school
shall have an established and announced policy with respect to academic freedom
and tenure.”194 Thus, the law professorate’s caste system is instantiated by the
regulations that govern the accreditation of law schools.
Tenure-line law professors—they may be coming for you, too. Although the
ABA regulations still require tenure for traditional law professors, some changes
to the regulations have given law schools more flexibility for reducing teaching
labor costs, which attenuate the tenure standard, even for traditional professors.195
One recent change is that the ABA no longer employs a student/teacher ratio in its
qualitative analysis of a school’s program of legal education.196 It used to be that
a school was incentivized to hire a certain amount of full-time tenure-track teachers
in an effort to maintain good student/teacher ratios.197 Under these regulations,
405(c) and 405(d) faculty were counted as a fraction of a full-time professor.198
Now, with the student/faculty ratio removed, schools have more flexibility to
employ non-tenure-track professors, such as professors holding “professors of the
practice” titles. Recently, a group of law deans attempted to remove tenure in its
entirety from section 405 of the ABA regulations.199 That attempt failed, but the
relentless logic of neoliberalism has not abated. There is also political animus
against the institution of tenure, with market logic of cost-savings used to justify
its erosion.200 It is likely that in the near future, as with undergraduate education,
law schools will see an accretion of tenured positions.
The original point of tenure is that it secured academic freedom, which has
traditionally been understood to protect professors who speak out on controversial
topics.201 However, neoliberalism’s diffuse market logic has eradicated this line
of thinking. Instead of a top-down inquiry into the qualitative value of a particular
argument or line of thought, which was what occurred in the 1990s with the critical
outsider scholars, neoliberalism asks what economic value does the activity bring
to the table and how much does it cost. And the answer, for many educational
institutions, is that faculty research and scholarship (particularly outside of STEM)
is not worth its cost. The end result is that universities are employing adjuncts,
contract teachers, and lecturers whose primary job description is to teach rather
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
199. See Ann Bartow, American Law Deans Association (ALDA) Attacks Tenure and Long Term
Contracts Standards §§ 205(c), 405, and 603(d), FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Mar. 30, 2006),
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2006/03/american-law-deans-association-alda-attack-tenure
-and-long-term-contracts-aba-standards-§§-205c-405-and-603d/.
200. Kimberly Hefling, Walker Erodes College Professor Tenure, POLITICO (July 12, 2015),
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/scott-walker-college-professor-tenure-120009.
201. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS,
https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure (last visited
Apr. 7. 2018).
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than research and write scholarship. This has a silencing effect.202 Free speech is
certainly impacted in this environment. Teachers outside of the tenure line, whose
contracts are renewed on a contingent basis, are conditioned to speak very
carefully.203 But what is different in the contemporary landscape is that the very
activity of speech has been written out of the equation. It is not part of the job
description. As one adjunct blogger writes: “The precious time and energy to
research and write and give papers have become unaffordable luxuries. Are rights
to speech real when the economic ability to employ those rights is lacking?”204
The absence of tenure for legal writing professors functions as a silencing
discipline in two ways. First, traditional freedom of speech is constrained. But
the second way is novel and represents a new kind of silencing discipline that is
very much a product of neoliberal trends in higher education. Since first convening
as a group in the 1980s, legal writing professors have developed into a professional
collective with sophisticated pedagogical practices and a growing body of
scholarship on critical rhetoric, persuasion, and legal process strategies. This has
happened despite the fact that legal writing professors are not expected, or paid, to
produce scholarship. In many ways, legal writing scholarship is as critical and
radical as it is practical.205
In many respects, this corner of legal writing scholarship has been inspired
and influenced by the critical outsider approaches in the 1990s. For instance, legal
writing (and clinic) professors developed the Applied Storytelling project,206 a
scholarly project that critically evaluates practices of rhetoric and persuasion in a
law advocacy context. Recently, a group of Applied Storytelling scholars came
together for a symposium on race and advocacy, which was published in the
Maryland Law Review.207 Legal writing (and clinic) professors also ignited the
Feminist Judgements project, a series of books in which law scholars take judicial
opinions and rewrite them from a feminist perspective.208 In all of these projects,

202. See generally Eva Swidler, Adjuncts and Academic Freedom, ACADEME BLOG (Sept. 19,
2016), https://academeblog.org/2016/09/19/adjuncts-and-academic-freedom/.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See generally Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, “Burn This Bitch Down!: Mike Brown, Emmett Till,
and the Gendered Politics of Black Parenthood, 17 NEV. L.J. 619 (2017); Susan Salmon,
Reconstructing the Voice of Authority, 51 AKRON L. REV. 143 (2017); Brad Desnoyer & Anne
Alexander, Race, Rhetoric, and Judicial Opinions, 76 MD. L. REV. 696 (2017); Carrie Sperling &
Kimberly Holst, Do Muddy Waters Shift Burdens, 76 MD. L. REV. 629 (2017); Elizabeth Berrenguer,
The Color of Fear: A Cognitive-Rhetorical Analysis of How Florida’s Subjective Fear Standard in
Stand Your Ground Cases Reifies Racism, 76 MD. L. REV. 726 (2017); Sherri Lee Keene, Stories
That Swim Upstream: Uncovering the Influence of Stereotypes and Stock Stories in Fourth
Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 76 MD. L. REV. 747 (2017); Donald R. Caster & Brian
C. Howe, Taking A Mulligan: The Special Challenges of Narrative Creation in the Post-Conviction
Context, 76 MD. L. REV. 770 (2017).
206. See generally Christopher Rideout, Applied Storytelling: A Bibliography, 12 LEGAL COMM.
& RHETORIC: JALWD 247 (2015).
207. See Symposium, Race and Advocacy, 76 MD. L. REV. 629, 629-791 (2017).
208. See generally FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (Kathryn Stanchi et al. eds., 2016).
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legal writing scholars have adopted the critical outsider movement’s position that
narrative and stories can positively expand legal consciousness for the better.
Some of the professors involved in these scholarly pursuits are among the
small minority of legal writing teachers on a tenure-line track. But many are not.
Although scholarship is not required in many legal writing positions, professors
still engage in the activity as a way to move up into a better professional position
or because of personal intellectual curiosity. There are multiple anecdotes of legal
writing professors being told by their deans not to write scholarship—not because
of the content of their work, but because the endeavor takes time and energy away
from their full-time teaching obligations. The legal writing professor’s dean may
not renew the professor’s contract, not because he/she disagrees with the contents
of the professor’s scholarship, but because he/she views the law professor as
insubordinate for writing anything in the first place. In this way, legal writing’s
work structure limits the production of valuable legal meanings.
Again, they may be coming for you, tenure-track and tenured law professors.
The erasure of research and legal scholarship from law professor job descriptions
applies to those professors who teach doctrinal courses, particularly those who are
hired as professors of the practice or lecturers, positions that typically do not
include remuneration for research and scholarship.209 Although the Socratic
method is the low-cost “Model-T” of legal education,210 enabling one professor to
reach a vast amount of law students in one lecture classroom, it would be cheaper
still to have that professor teach three or four classes a semester, in lieu of only
two, with time for scholarship endeavors. ln this way, this trend is disturbingly
relevant beyond the legal skills professorate.
Moreover, neoliberal market logic denies the value of alternative discourses,
regardless of their origin, from doctrinal or writing teachers. As discussed above,
in response to legal formalism’s silencing of contextualized voices from the
margins,211 alternative jurisprudential movements pushed the envelope to
challenge existing categories and thought patterns.212 As one’s scholarship
influences one’s teaching, this discourse dynamic benefits students, helps them to
see beyond the IRAC structure to envision creative strategies for using the law, for
progressive policy-making or social justice for individual clients. Neoliberalist
logic, however, views this discourse dynamic as a luxury item that distracts from
the true purpose of education, which is training for work.213 As the reasoning goes,
law schools should focus on teaching students the law and practice skills so that
they can get jobs. Ethics is a matter of learning enough to pass the MPRE.
Moreover, this silencing discipline operates in a masked way. In the
academic debates in the 1990s, traditional voices implied that critical outsider
scholarship was subpar, not worthy of tenure. Such views likely caused a chilling
209. See supra notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
210. Schlegel, supra note 80, at 323.
211. See supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
212. See Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law Seriously, supra note 85, at 564-76 (discussing, among
others, legal realism, law & society, critical legal studies, and outsider theories as modes of
jurisprudence that challenged the legal formalism’s foundations).
213. See BROWN, supra note 5, at 188-92.
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effect, but the silencing occurred in the context of a competitive debate in which
all the players valued the activity itself, even if there was disagreement over the
content. Now, market logic holds that the very activity of engaging in research
and scholarship is not valued, and because it is not paid for (it is not part of the job
description), it does not exist.
Neoliberalism, taken too far, will siphon the very life and soul out of
academic debate. In all previous controversies that have unfolded on law review
pages, there was argument between human authors. In the 1990s, in arguing
whether enlightenment-based norms of reason and objectivity were superior to
context infused narrative approaches, there was never a suggestion that individual
humans could not and should not theorize solutions to legal problems. While
neoliberalism places great emphasis on individual “human capital” performance in
a competitive system,214 at the same time, it removes the romantic concept of
individual authorship. Instead of human thinking, problems are solved by a vast,
diffuse apparatus of things categorized as market forces.215 In the 1990s, scholars
brought forth radical concepts for other thinkers to inspect and critique. Now,
instead of using human thought—infused with moral, spiritual, and yes, even
enlightenment principles—decisions are passively made using benchmarks, best
practices, guidelines, and big-data algorithms deployed to locate the maximum
amount of profitability and utility.216
Nonetheless, neoliberalist logic is highly persuasive in the context of legal
education, particularly in light of the intense stakes—high student debt loads and
fewer government and private firm law careers (which are themselves products of
neoliberal trends). And teaching labor is very expensive. But this logic misses the
point that lawyers are not just workers; they are professionals charged with solving
uniquely human problems, a process that requires the development of intellectual
curiosity and criticality. While neoliberalist logic about the purpose of legal
education does not differ much from earlier arguments about the need for
practicality in legal education,217 the difference here is that law teaching jobs are
being structured to wholly remove critical, interdisciplinary, and theoretical
inquiries from the job itself. This prevents any discourse dynamic from sprouting
up in the first place. And all of this is happening without democratic process,
faculty governance, or participation; it is often accomplished through fiat by
university administrators and technocrats.218
CONCLUSION
The market-based logic that enables silencing discipline is dangerous for any
member of the academy who speaks and writes about issues that challenge the
214. Blalock, supra note 174, at 88-89; BROWN, supra note 5, at 32-33.
215. For a concise, contemporary explanation of the apparatus concept, see PASI VALIAHO,
BIOPOLITICAL SCREENS: IMAGE, POWER, AND THE NEOLIBERAL BRAIN 11-13 (2014).
216. BROWN, supra note 5, at 34-33. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
217. See generally Edwards, supra note 142.
218. See supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271967
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271967

Spring 2018]

SILENCING DISCIPLINE

683

status quo. Thoughtful and critical scholarship, which influences teaching, shifts
law student knowledge from a beginner’s primitive understanding of the law to a
lawyer’s professional understanding. Teaching and scholarship (along with
service) have long formed the foundation of a university professor, including the
traditional law professor. For some time now, however, scholarship has been
absent from the job descriptions of most legal writing professors. Despite this,
after two decades of professionalization, legal writing professors have produced a
body of meaningful scholarship on the topics of legal rhetoric, communication,
and persuasion. Inspired by critical race theory, feminist legal theory and other
outsider approaches, current legal writing scholarship sets forth strategies for
foregrounding context, empathy, and lived experience within the framework of
formal legal narratives.219 It is critical, but also practical.
However, market logic silences this work by refusing to value the work itself,
regardless of its content. This logic could easily migrate to other areas of the law
school, making it such that all professors must teach more, and write and think
less. This is especially true in light of the fact that legal scholarship is not, as a
general rule, connected to outside grant money. Incisive legal scholarship is
valuable to the legal discourse community because it produces ethical, holistic, and
thoughtful lawyers, even if it does not line up directly with a positive economic
outcome at any given moment. I encourage all members of the academy to look
at this pattern.

219. See supra notes 200 & 203 and accompanying text.
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